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Review and Response: Kocku von Stuckrad’s
Study on The Scientification of Religion
with Leonardo Ambasciano,“(Pseudo)science, Religious Beliefs, and Historiography:
Assessing The Scientification of Religion’s Method and Theory”; and Kocku von
Stuckrad, “The Hybridity of Scientific Knowledge: A Response to Leonardo Ambasciano.”
THE HYBRIDITY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE:
A RESPONSE TO LEONARDO AMBASCIANO
by Kocku von Stuckrad
Abstract. This article responds to Leonardo Ambasciano’s review
of The Scientification of Religion: An Historical Study of Discursive
Change, 1800–2000 by Kocku von Stuckrad. It criticizes a narrative
that presents naturalism and science as the ultimate system of knowl-
edge. Contesting this rhetoric, the article underscores the plurality
and hybridity of knowledge systems, which is the main topic of the
book under review.
Keywords: discourse research; knowledge; naturalism; religion and
science
There are many systems of knowledge in European and North American
cultural history that have interacted, and sometimes competed, with one
another. All of these systems are hybrid, which means that their plausibility
and their cultural acceptance are in constant flux, even though some of
these systems present themselves as having privileged access to truth and
reality. If we look at the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we can see the
emergence of a knowledge system of “science” that has repercussions on
both the “natural sciences” and the “humanities.” Around 1900, cultural
knowledge was established in new academic disciplines, from anthropology
to religious studies, sociology, theoretical physics, biology, Indology, and so
on. This professionalization of knowledge about nature, the human being,
and other fields of cultural interest has led to a codification of what today
is regarded as scientific and theoretically sound. In this process, the borders
between accepted and nonaccepted knowledge have shifted (again). What
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is more, academic theories have exerted a significant influence on public
discourses, and it is this influence on and interaction with broader societal
processes that I address as the “scientification of religion.”
If we want to understand the shifting meanings and demarcations that
give “science” and “religion” their cultural location, we will have to look
at the relationality of science and religion, rather than starting with a defi-
nition of the terms. It is in mutual relation that science and religion—just
like many other concepts—receive their meaning (see also Vollmer and
von Stuckrad 2016). From this perspective, we don’t care too much about
what science and religion “really” are, and may even regard the attempt at
finding an answer to that question futile. What we do care about is how
societies communicate about these concepts, draw boundaries, and convey
meaning to religion and science in relation to each other, and in relation
to other concepts. Discourse research, particularly when it is informed by
Michel Foucault and the sociology of knowledge, provides an excellent
theoretical framework for our inquiry into the dynamics of construction,
legitimization, contestation, organization, and material manifestation of
knowledge in a given society. Clearly positioned in this theoretical frame-
work, The Scientification of Religion (von Stuckrad 2014) attempts to find
tentative answers to the question of how academic (secular) environments
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have conveyed new meanings to
religion, and how these meanings have resulted in new forms of religious
practice. Academic authorities, scientists, and other experts form a dis-
course community with readers, practitioners, novelists, artists, politicians,
and all the other actors partaking in the discourse under consideration.
Again, the differentiation between expert knowledge and lay knowledge
is a moving target that discourse research addresses in all its fluidity.
It is interesting to see that at the beginning of his review, Leonardo
Ambasciano seems to “get” the main argument of The Scientification of
Religion, but then he loses it completely. In much of his critique he reads
things into my text that I would never say, or takes certain positions for
granted that I in fact problematize in the book. Because these biases seem
to be representative of a powerful discourse today, the following remarks
are not just meant as a response to Ambasciano but as a comment on
broader cultural debates as well.
It is noteworthy that Ambasciano presents the content of my analysis
in a language that is completely absent from or even explicitly problema-
tized in the book. For instance, nowhere in the book do I write about a
“fringe, quasi-religious or crypto religious cult by some overzealous sup-
porters who misinterpreted and/or distorted Darwin’s ideas” (Ambasciano
2016, 1064); it would also be hard to find evidence in the book that I
address “the vicious cycle, or self-reinforcing loop, of scholars whose aca-
demic output fed into the creation of modern religious discourses and
cult revivals” (Ambasciano 2016, 1064). Using this language to describe
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the material I analyze in the book is a serious distortion of my argument.
Ambasciano’s text is actually a good example of discursive Othering and the
drawing of lines between “religion” and things other than religion (“quasi-
religious” “crypto religious,” “cult”), between “true Darwinism” and its
“distortions” (even by leading thinkers of Darwinism in Europe), and so
on. This language is the object of my analysis, not its instrument.
This type of uncritical self-confidence that feels comfortable making
strong judgments about systems of knowledge that differ from its reduc-
tionist definition of “true science” is problematic. The author’s normative
understanding of science seems to be the reason why he assumes that my
book is a “plea for discrediting and questioning the credibility of science.”
It is not. The book is an analysis of science as a social phenomenon and as
discursive practice, and it is an analysis of the shifting borders between what
communities regard as valid knowledge about the world. I have no stakes
in the question of what is the “true representation of reality,” hence I don’t
talk about “heuristic value,” as Ambasciano thinks I do. But I am indeed
critical of the unreflected use of biased terms such as “pseudo-science.” On
page 61 of my book, I quote Roger Cooter’s apt conclusion: “From the
history of phrenology and other such pseudo-sciences, it is clear there is
more to be lost than gained historically by seeking retrospectively to draw
sharp distinctions between the ‘real’ and the ‘pseudo’ in science” (Cooter
2003, 684; see also von Stuckrad 2014, 56–62, 86–88).
Still, Ambasciano takes issue with the fact that I do not condemn
“pseudo-science” as wrong and dangerous. He concludes that therefore
I must be a caretaker of these “cults.” Such a conclusion, though logically
flawed, is unfortunately quite common (on astrology as a case in point,
see von Stuckrad 2016). This rhetorical figure is the same one identified
by Jeffrey J. Kripal as the basic problem that scholars have to face if they
study phenomena that dominant discourse disregards as “paranormal” or
“pseudo-science.” One response, says Kripal, is “the ideological debunker
(as opposed to the fair and open-minded skeptic), standard scientist, or
conventional materialist who seeks to protect a flatland materialist world-
view by simply keeping off the table all of the fantastic stuff that suggests that
we are living in a super natural world that is anything but flat” (Strieber
and Kripal 2016, 11, emphasis in original). Among the most common
strategies employed in this discourse are “a naive understanding of mind
that classifies all visionary phenomena as simple ‘imaginary’ products of
brain matter (without the slightest clue how this works)” and “the public
shaming of sincere and serious people, from all walks of life, who see or
say otherwise” (Strieber and Kripal 2016, 11). There are certainly points
of disagreement between Kripal’s and my own historical and theoretical
convictions, but when it comes to giving historical credit to knowledge
systems that are ultimately incommensurable—which means that we can’t
prove or falsify the one with the instruments of the other—I agree with
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him that it is evidence of bad scientific method to debunk alternative
systems of knowledge without actually being able to falsify them. This is
why I acknowledge the possibility (!) that Helena P. Blavatsky had medi-
umistic skills; in turn, the underlying discursive structure is probably why
Ambasciano regards my neutral position as a “bizarre apologetic apogee”
(Ambasciano 2016, 1065).
As a consequence, I don’t see how “new realism” would challenge dis-
cursive approaches to religion and science. Ambasciano’s bringing in “the
indeconstructible [sic!] ontological basis of natural sciences” seems to me
just a replication of old narratives about science’s privileged access to reality,
and nothing that discourse research is really engaged with. What is discur-
sively interesting, though, is the fact that naturalism and the narratives it
reinforces have dominated many fields in the humanities recently, includ-
ing the study of religion. This is in line with what Lisa Sideris calls “new
cosmology”—including “epic science”—that “typically coalesces around a
single story of evolution often touted as so complete or cutting-edge as to
suggest that we are in the final frontier, closing in on the final cosmic mys-
teries. In its totalizing ambition, the new cosmology reaches, paradoxically,
toward the eradication of wonder itself ” (Sideris in The Immanent Frame
2015).
But the ontological discussion is relevant in a different way. As I have
said repeatedly, discourse research and other constructionist approaches are
about attributions of meaning to things, regardless of the ontological status
of the things themselves (von Stuckrad 2014, 9; von Stuckrad 2016, 216–
17). These approaches do not deny that there are things (and aworld) before
and after their discursivization; they only adopt a skeptical position vis-a`-vis
knowledge systems that claim a privileged access to the ultimate meaning
of things. “New realism” therefore does not really challenge constructionist
approaches; such a challenge comes fromwhat has recently been introduced
as “new materialism” (Coole and Frost 2010). The dependency of humans
on things (Hodder 2012) limits the possibilities of the discursivization
of things; nonhuman agents and objects become active parts of discourse
communities in a way that classic discourse theory had not foreseen. This
new focus on relationality provides intriguing opportunities to further
develop discursive theories and question the implicit anthropocentrism that
characterizes constructionist approaches (see von Stuckrad forthcoming).
I do hope these brief remarks help to clarify what The Scientification of
Religion is (and is not) all about. I want to thank Leonardo Ambasciano
for engaging with the book.
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